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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

did decrease in value that alone will not justify the injunction. 46 C. J.
682.
The plaintiff has been fortunate in that he has been able to enjoy
his country estate for so long a time, he must now yield to the change
and progress of the times.
In regard to the property rights of a land owner in the air over his
land, it is clear that in all legislation pertaining to such, that both
Congress and the States proceed upon the treory that a land owner has
no exclusive property in the higher air spaces. Both the Constitution
of the United States and of Ohio protect in broad terms the rights
of property, but neither contains any classification or definition of
property, any more than they reveal the contents of the word liberty.
94 U. S. 113.
What the owners property rights are, so far as air space above is
concerned, has not been declared by legislation, nor have such rights
been fixed by the courts as yet. The plaintiff relies upon the old common law maxim of "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum." The
court cited a long list of English and U. S. cases in which reference
was made to the ancient maxim, but there were no cases which involved an adjudication of property rights in the air space which would
be normally used by airplanes. It is true that the maxim has been
used as the basis for some decisions, but it is the points actually decided, not the maxims, which establish the law. A maxim, said Sir
Frederick Pollock, "is a symbol or vehicle of the law so far as it
goes; it is not the law itself, still less the whole of the law, even on
its own ground."
What was the "coelum" or originally intended by the early Latin
writers? When used, it commonly referred to the lower air spaces,
or that space in which the birds fly and the clouds drift. Another
writer spoke of it as the space lying only a little above the highest
treetop. 62 Amer. Law Rev. 894.
Thus, it appears that the maxim has never been applied in cases
which fixed rights in the space traveled by airplanes, and since there
are no previous decisions which establish rules as to such, any reasonable regulatory legislation would be constitutional, but so far no legislative provisions have established any exclusive proprietary rights
in the land owner to the adjoining air spaces normally travelled by
the airplanes.
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Constitutional Law: Due Process.
"What is due process of law must be determined by the circumstances * * * ", said Justice McKenna in Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219

U. S. 296. In relation to taxation it has been agreed that due process

NOTES AND COMMENT

in reference to the XIV Amendment of the U. S. Constitution requires three things in order that there has been a valid assessment on
property: notice to the person being taxed, a hearing before the taxing body, and a method of appeal before some court.*
In September 1930 the Northwestern Lumber Company appealed
to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin contending that a reassessment of
their property had been invalid because they had proceeded without
due process. The plaintiff corporation was engaged in the number business since Jan. 1, 1911, and had acquired large tracts of timber to
engag,4-in this business, part of this property being obtained before
ani -pa't;fter Jan. 1, 1911. They had filed an income tax return every
year in accordance with the Income Tax Law and had paid their taxes
according to their assessments. In 1926 it appeared that the property
and income of the' corporation had been under-assessed, and the defendant commission reassessed property acquired by the plaintiffs
partly before and partly after Jan. 1, 1916. The proceeding was authorized by section 71.10, Wis. Stats., 1925, which provided for a
reassessment on the property and income of the corporation where it
has been later found that there has been an under-assessment on the
property and income of the corporation where it has been later found
that there has been an under-assessment of such property and income.
The statutory limitation made it permissible to reassess only the incomes following Jan. 1, 1916. The company objected to the reassessment of its holdings previous to Jan. 1, 1916 in a hearing before the
•defendant tax commission, but the commission would deduct merely
the assessment on unused property in accordance with Oconto Co. v.
Tax Commission, 193 Wis., 488.
The plaintiff company brought the case up for appeal in the Supreme Court 'contending among other things that its rights under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of
Wisconsin were being violated in that the method of the Wisconsin Tax
Commission in this case in going back of the statutory limitation set
by section 71.10 deprives the plaintiff of property without due process
of law. 231 N. W. 865.
The Supreme Court discounted all of these contentions involving
constitutional rights and maintained that this question did not even
enter into the case. They held that the method of the commission in
taking into account the property acquired before Jan. 1, 1916, the
statutory limit for reassessing under-taxed incomes was not a deprivation of property without due process because such an assessment was
necessary to effectively ascertain the true income of the company during th years of 1916 to 1824 inclusive.
"210 U. S. 373; 159-U. S 526; 189 U. S.285i 207 U. S,127.
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The Ta'x commission was backed and moved by virtue of the statutes 71.10 which provided for a ten day notice to the corporation
before proceeding with the reassessment, and section 71.155 which
provides for a hearing of the plaintiff corporation before the tax commission in the Circuit Court of Dane County, and sub-division 5 of
the same section provides for an appeal on the judgment within 20
days of its recording before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
And, although the case was reversed in part as to other contentions, it is a good illustration of the futility of attacking the methods
of a taxing body, because in its practice it seems to be violating the
due process c4auses of the state and federal constitutions, if such body
moves by authority of a statute which provides in some way for a
notice to the assessed party, a hearing before the assessing body, and
some method for appealing the assessment to a court for final adjudication.
FRANCIS ACKERMAN

Insurance.
Behnke v. Standard Acc. Inc. Co. of Detroit, 41 Fed. 696, is an
appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment of the District Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The action is
based upon a complaint purporting to state two causes of action, the
first upon an alleged express contract by the appellee to insure appellants against liability under the Wisconsin Workmens Compensation
Act, and the second upon 'an alleged tort, in that appellee negligently
failed to enter into, or to notify the appellants within a reasonable
time that it refused to enter into the contract of insurance.
The facts are as follows: the appellants, engaged in operating a
portable sawmill and logging in Forest County, Wisconsin, whose
compensation insurance had been handled by Ross Richardson prior
to October, 1925, were advised by him in September, 1925, that their
present policy procured by him with the London Guaranty and Accident Company would expire October 1, 1925. They were also advised
that they would have to seek insurance elsewhere because that company refused to renew the policy. Richardson, who was an agent of
the Fidelity Deposit Company of Maryland, thereupon wrote Wolff,
the general manager of the Milwaukee district for the same company
stating that he had the application for the insurance, outlining it as
best he could, and asking whether Wolff could secure the compensation insurance from some company. Neither Wolff nor Richardson
was an agent of the appellee company nor of the George H. Russell
Company, its Milwaukee agent.
Wolff answered on stationery bearing the letterhead of the Fidelity
and Deposit Company, saying that he believed that he could procure
the policy and asking for the details regarding the risk. This letter

